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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARGOT de VILLIERS,

:
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

UTAH COUNTY, HIGHLAND CITY,
and JOHN DOES 1-3,

::

Appeal No.

Defendants.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal arises from a final judgment of the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah.

The

Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2(3)(j) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did genuine issues of material fact preclude summary

judgment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Summary judgment is proper only when there are

no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah
1991); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 819 P. 2d 803
1991).

On

review

of a summary

judgment, the

(Utah

losing party

is

entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences
1

fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to
him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah
1991).
2. Did Utah County have a duty, based on Utah statute or
common law, to use reasonable care to warn motorists using 6000
West of the perilous sight distance hazard associated with the
Intersection?
Standard of Review;

In deciding whether judgment as a matter of

law was proper, the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial
court's view of the law; the appellate court reviews it for
correctness.

Ron Case Roofing

and Asphalt

Paving,

Inc. v.

Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Olwell v. Clark,
658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
3.

Did Utah County have a duty to conduct a traffic and

engineering study before lowering the speed along 6000 West,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-48 (1988)?
Standard of Review;

In deciding whether judgment as a matter of

law was proper, the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial
court's view of the law; the appellate court reviews it for
correctness.

Ron

Case Roofing

and Asphalt

Paving, Inc. v.

Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel S U P P I V CO. V.
2

Salt Lake Citv Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Olwell v. Clark,
658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND ORDINANCES
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-22 (1988) provides:
Local
authorities,
in
their
respective
jurisdictions,
shall
place
and
maintain
official traffic-control devices upon highways
under
their
jurisdiction
as
they
find
necessary to indicate and to carry out the
provisions of this chapter or local traffic
ordinances, or to regulate, warn, or guide
traffic. All traffic control devices erected
under this section shall conform to and be
maintained in conformance with the Department
of Transportation manual and specifications
for a uniform system of traffic-control
devices under Section 41-6-20.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1988), provides in pertinent part:
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and
subject to subsection (3) and Sections 41-6-47
and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful.
Any speed in excess of these limits is prima
facie
evidence
that
the
speed
is
not
reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a
school building or its grounds during
school recess or while children are going
to or leaving school during opening or
closing
hours,
except
that
local
authorities may require a complete stop
before passing a school building or
grounds at any of these periods;
(b) twenty-five
district; and

miles

per

hour

in

any

urban

(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-48 (1988) provides:

3

(1) When local authorities in their respective
jurisdictions determine on the basis of an
engineering and traffic investigation that the
prima facie speed permitted under this article
is not reasonable and safe under the
conditions found to exist upon a highway or
part of a highway, the local authority may
determine a reasonable and safe prima facie
limit which:
(a)
(b)
(c)
but

decreases the limit
increases the limit
decreases the limit
not to less than 35

at intersections;
within an urban district;
outside an urban district,
miles per hour.

(2) Local authorities in their respective
jurisdictions
shall
determine
by
an
engineering and traffic investigation the
prima facie speed for all highways under their
respective jurisdictions and shall declare a
reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which
may be different than the prima facie speed
permitted under this chapter for an urban
district.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for injuries she
suffered as a result of an automobile collision she was involved in
at

the

intersection

"Intersection")

in

of

Utah

6000
County

West
on

and
January

11500

North

(the

18,

1990.

The

Intersection was constructed in the early 1980's in connection with
the development of the Oakview PUD subdivision in Highland City,
Utah County. The Plaintiff lived in the Oakview PUD at the time of
the accident.

4

Originally, the developer of the Oakview PUD designed
11500 North

(a/k/a Oakview Drive) to run straight along the

northern boundary of the Oakview PUD property line.

However, the

Highland City Planning Commission refused to approve the Oakview
PUD until the developer agreed to move a portion of 11500 North to
the south such that 11500 North separated the PUDfs common ground
from the residential lots. However, under this arrangement, 11500
North intersected with 6000 West approximately 141 feet closer to
the crest of a hill on 6000 West. Subsequent investigation of the
Intersection revealed that the Intersection was so close to the
crest of the hill on 6000 West that it violated the safety
standards for the construction of intersections which are set forth
by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials in their publication

"A Policy on Geometric Design of

Highways and Streets." The publication is uniformly accepted by all
traffic engineers

in the State of Utah as the authoritative

treatise on road construction safety standards.
The close proximity between the Intersection and the
crest of the hill on 6000 West created a dangerous sight distance
problem in that motorists entering the Intersection from 11500
North will not be able to see motorists entering the Intersection
from 6000 West, and vice versa, in time to avoid a collision.

5

The Plaintiff brought suit against both Highland City and
Utah County. The Plaintiff claimed that Utah County had a duty to
maintain its roads in a condition reasonably safe for travel. This
duty included a duty to warn motorists of the dangerous nature of
the Intersection. Plaintiff alleged that Utah County breached this
duty by failing to place warning signs or using other means to warn
motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous Intersection and by
failing to conduct a traffic and engineering study before lowering
the speed limit along 6000 West. Plaintiff contended that if Utah
County would have conducted such a study, it would have learned of
the dangerous sight distance problem at the Intersection, and
should have installed appropriate safety measures to warn motorists
using 6000 West of the dangerous Intersection. Utah Code Ann. §416-48 (1988).
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Utah County moved for summary judgment, arguing that it
had no duty to place signs at the Intersection because 11500 North
was a private road. Utah County relied on the Utah Supreme Courtfs
ruling in Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970),
for the proposition that it had no duty to warn users of 6000 West
of the private road entering the Intersection.
Plaintiff opposed the summary judgment, arguing that Utah
County had a duty to warn and that this duty was not eliminated by
6

the Stevens decision. Plaintiff also argued that there were several
genuine issues of material fact, including, among others: (1) did
Utah County have notice of the dangerous condition?; (2) was Utah
County negligent per se because it failed to conduct a traffic and
engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit along 6000
West?; (3) would a "blind intersection" sign have prevented this
accident?; (4) would a "blind intersection" sign with flashers have
prevented the accident?; (5) would the installation of flashers
have prevented this accident?; (6) would the accident have been
prevented if Utah County would have conducted the legally mandated
traffic and engineering study? Plaintiff argued that if these
factual issues were resolved in her favor, the legal principles
governing this area of the law would mandate a judgment for the
Plaintiff.
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of
Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970) and Jones v.
Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). The Court held that
Utah County did not have a duty to protect users of either 6000
West or 11500 North from the dangerous sight distance problem. The
trial court also ruled that Utah County did not have a duty to
conduct a traffic and engineering study because it concluded that
Utah County did not lower the speed limit.
7

V.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

The Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident

on January 18, 1990, at the Intersection in Highland City, Utah
County, State of Utah. R. 165.
2.

As

a

result

of

the

accident,

Plaintiff

is a

paraplegic. R. 347.
3.

11500 North provides access to the Oakview Planned

Unit Development ("PUD"). R. 486. The Oakview PUD was developed in
the early 1980fs and contains eight lots. R. 347.
4.

Paul Frampton was the developer of the Oakview PUD.

R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 5-6).
5.

In developing the Oakview PUD, Mr. Frampton hired

Richard Clayton to assist him in obtaining approval

for the

subdivision from the Highland City Planning Commission. Mr. Clayton
had previously developed and obtained approval for another Planned
Unit Development located immediately to the west of the Oakview PUD
in Highland City. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 6-7); R.
353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 6-7).
6.

Before a developer can commence construction of a

PUD in Highland City, the developer must submit a proposed plat of
the development to the Highland City Planning Commission for

8

consideration and approval. R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton,
p. 10).
7.

Mr. Clayton hired Nature's Estates Engineering to

prepare a plat for the Oakview PUD and to submit that plat to the
Highland

City

Planning

Commission

for

consideration.

R.353

(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 11).
8.

After the proposed plat for the Oakview PUD had been

completed by Nature's Estates Engineering, it was submitted to, but
rejected

by,

the Highland

City

Planning

Commission.

R.

353

(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 12) ; R. 486 (Deposition of Paul
Frampton, pp. 11-13).
9.

In the original plat of the Oakview PUD prepared by

Nature's Estates Engineering,

11500 North was designed

as a

straight road which ran east along the northern boundary of the
Oakview PUD property line until it intersected with 6000 West. R.
597

(Exhibit

"A" to Plaintiff's Memorandum

in Opposition of

Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A"); R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 11-12); R.
353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 12-13) .
10.
Highland

Mr. Clayton and Mr. Frampton were notified by the

City Planning Commission that before the City would

approve the Oakview PUD plat, Mr. Frampton would have to move part
of 11500 North to the south so that the common area of the PUD
9

would be separated from the lots by 11500 North. R. 486 (Deposition
of Paul Frampton, pp. 12-13); R. 353

(Deposition of Richard

Clayton, pp. 14-15).
11.

In accordance with the conditions set forth by the

Highland City Planning Commission, the Oakview PUD plat finally
accepted by Highland City shows that 11500 North curves to the
south and cuts through the property such that the common area is
separated from the home lots. 11500 North intersects with 6000 West
approximately 141 feet south of where it was originally planned to
intersect.

R. 597

(Exhibit "B" of Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Opposition to Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B"); R. 486

(Deposition of Paul

Frampton, pp. 11-12); R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp.
12-13).
12.

The

Intersection

designed

by

Highland

City

is

defective, unsafe, and dangerous because the gradient on 6000 West
as it approaches the Intersection is excessive. The Intersection is
also dangerous because

southbound vehicles

on 6000 West and

motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North do not have
adequate sight distance to perceive and react to each other.
Motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North cannot see
vehicles approaching the Intersection on 6000 West until the

10

vehicle is only 285 feet away. C. Arthur Geurts, a licensed traffic
engineer in the State of Utah, testified by affidavit as follows:
7.
Specifically, when Highland City required
the developer (Paul Frampton) to move the
Intersection from where it was proposed on the
original plat approximately 141 feet to the
south as a condition precedent to approval of
the Oakview plat, the following AASHTO design
standards were violated:
a.
Approach Gradient: For intersections like the
one positioned at 6000 West and 11500 North, AASHTO
specifies that the maximum approach gradient is 6
percent. Therefore, because Oakview Drive has an
approach gradient of at least 7 1/2 percent, the
Intersection violates AASHTO approach gradient
standards;1 and
b.
Sight Distance: Based on the 85th percentile
speed of vehicles traveling on 6000 West and the
excessive approach gradients at the Intersection,
AASHTO specifies that the Intersection in question
should have a sight distance in excess of 500 feet.
Therefore, because the sight distance at the
Intersection is only 265 feet, the Intersection
violates AASHTO sight standards.
8.
Based on the results of my traffic study
and the specific violations of the AASHTO
1

"When the approach gradient of an intersection is greater
than that specified by AASHTO, the required sight distance for the
intersection must be increased because the excessive gradient
negatively effects the acceleration capabilities of vehicles
entering the Intersection and such vehicles require more time to
enter the intersection and cross the through lanes of traffic.
Based on my observations of the land 141 feet to the north of the
Intersection (where the original Oakview PUD plat proposed the
Intersection be located), if Highland City had approved the
original Oakview PUD plat as submitted by the developer (Paul
Frampton) and his engineers (Nature's Estates), there would have,
in all probability, been no violation of the AASHTO approach
gradient standards."
11

standards enumerated above, it is my opinion
that the Intersection is defective, unsafe and
dangerous and that the specified deficiencies
were a real and proximate cause of the subject
accident,
R. 597 (Exhibit "C" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment).
13.

Officer Kerry Evans, the officer from the Utah

County Sheriff's office who investigated the accident, stated in
his Accident Report that:
The intersection at 6000 West 11500 North is a poorly
designed one in my opinion. The north bo[und] traffic
and the west bound traffic cannot see each other until
the No[orth] Bo[und] vehicle crests the hill.
The
absence of skid marks of both vehicles in this accident
shows this.
R. 597 (Exhibit "D" of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment).
14.

Utah County did not undertake any steps to warn

motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous sight distance problem
at the Intersection by use of signs.
15.

Utah County lowered the speed limit along 6000 West

from the prima facie speed limit of 55 miles per hour established
by the Utah Legislature. However, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Utah County lowered the speed limit an
by how much. Officer Kerry Evans testified:
Q. Do you know what the posted speed limit was
on this section of road?
12

A. I'm thinking—
MR. HENNING: Don't guess. I you can't recall, tell him
your recollection, but don't guess.
THE WITNESS: 35.
Q. (Mr. Lund) Was it posted?
A. Yes.
R. 354 (Deposition of Kerry Evans, p. 18). On the other hand, Mr.
Paul Hawker, Utah County's traffic engineer, testified:
Q. Do you now what the speed limit is on that roads?
***

A. Accurately I don't remember what the speed limit is.
Q. If the speed limit is not posted on a rural road lie
that, what would it be by statute, do you know that?
A. County ordinance states that any county road not
posted is 40 miles per hour, or has a speed limit of 40
miles an hour. That road doesn't go 40 miles per hour.
R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, pp. 13-14).
16.

Utah

County

did

not

conduct

a

"traffic

and

engineering study" on the section of 6000 West involved in this
litigation from 1979 through 1989:
Interrogatory No. 5 Identify all traffic
engineering studies, speed zone studies and or
safety studies for 6000 West from Star Route
(11100 South northerly to 11800 North) in Utah
County for the years 19799 [sic]-1989.
Answer: None.

13

(Defendant Utah County's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories, Requests of Admissions and Requests for Production
of Documents.)
17.

On January 18, 1990, the Plaintiff approached the

Intersection and stopped. R. 347. The Plaintiff looked both ways.
She then entered the Intersection. The Plaintiff was hit by a north
bound vehicle approaching the Intersection on 6000 West immediately
after she entered the Intersection from 11500 North in an attempt
to turn south onto 6000 West.

R. 597 (Exhibit "E" of Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Opposition to Highland City's Motion for Summary
Judgment).
18.

As

a

result

of the

accident,

Plaintiff

is a

paraplegic. R. 347 (Highland City's Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[s]ummary judgment should
be granted with great caution in negligence cases". Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court has
also held that: "Although summary judgment may on occasion be
appropriate in negligence cases, it is appropriate only in the most
clear-cut cases." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah
1987) . Application of these principles to the instant case demands

14

that this case be remanded for a jury determination of Utah
County's negligence,
IIA. Utah County had a non-delegable duty to maintain its roads and
streets in a condition reasonably safe for travel. Bowen v.
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982). This duty includes a
duty to warn motorists of conditions on or adjacent to the road
which render the road not reasonably safe for travel.
One treatise typically followed by the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that as a general rule, a governmental entity has a duty
"to take proper precautions to guard against accidents by the use
of railings, barriers, lights, or the like, especially at night."
18 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 54.90a, at
pp.

334-35. Similarly, American Jurisprudence has stated that

"[w]here the responsible public authority

has notice of the

dangerous condition of a highway, it has the duty in the exercise
of reasonable care to place warning signs thereon, and it is liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its neglect to do so." 39
Am.Jur.2d, Highways. Streets, and Bridges. § 398 (1968). Also
instructive is Annotation, Highways: Governmental Duty to Provide
Curve

Warnings

or Markings,

57 A.L.R.4th

342

(1987),

which

concludes that the general rule is that "[m]oreover, it is the duty
of the responsible public authority to maintain warning signs when

15

reasonably necessary to enable travelers exercising ordinary care
and prudence to avoid injury." Id. § 2 [a], at 349.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that governmental
entities must warn of dangerous conditions in their streets and
roads. For example, in Bramel v. Utah State Road Commission. 465
P.2d 534 (Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court held that:
The answer to the first proposition is to be
found in applying the test found so generally
throughout the law of torts, and which is also
applicable here: Did the defendant Road
Commission discharge its duty of exercising
reasonable care under the circumstances by
placing adequate and appropriate warning signs
for the safety of traffic using the highway?
Id. at 536

(emphasis added) ; see also Carroll v. State Road

Commission. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1970).
Thus, the vast majority of authorities have held that
governmental entities must warn motorists of dangerous conditions
in their roads which render the roads not "reasonably safe for
travel."
IIB. Utah law also imposes a statutory duty upon governmental
entities to warn motorists of dangerous conditions in streets and
roads. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988). Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22
(1988) states that governmental entities "shall" erect traffic
control devices to "regulate, warn, or guide traffic."

The term

"shall" is typically construed as imposing a mandatory requirement
as opposed to a mere direction. Board of Educ. of Granite School v.
16

Salt Lake City. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983).

Thus, Utah County

has not only a common law duty to warn motorists of dangerous
conditions on its roads, but it also has a statutory duty.
IIC. Utah County also has a self imposed duty to warn motorists.
Utah County has accepted the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices as it standard. The manual provides that

"Signs are

essential where special regulations apply at specific places or at
specific times only, or where hazards are not self-evident." Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, § 2A-1
(1988). The Manual also provides that:
Warning signs are used when it is deemed
necessary to warn traffic of existing or
potentially
hazardous
conditions
on or
adjacent to a highway or street. Warning signs
require caution on the part of the vehicle
operator and may call for a reduction of speed
or a maneuver in the interest of his own
safety and that of other vehicle operators and
pedestrians.
Id. § 2C-1 (emphasis added). Thus, Utah County's own standards
required it to warn motorists of the dangerous condition of the
Intersection.
III. The trial court erroneously relied upon Stevens v. Salt Lake
County, 478 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1970), and Jones v. Bountiful City.
834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), in concluding that Utah County did
not have a duty to warn motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous
Intersection. Stevens is inapplicable because the Utah Supreme
17

Court took great pains to limit the holding of that case to its
facts. Also, Stevens should not apply to the present case because
the intersection involved here was between a paved, improved county
road and a paved, improved subdivision road. Clearly, the Utah
Supreme Court did not intend by its ruling in Stevens to relieve
governmental entities of their duty to maintain their roads in a
condition reasonably safe or travel simply because the causative
force was not on the road itself.
The trial court also erroneously relied upon Jones v.
Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). The basis for this
Court's decision in Jones was that a municipality could not be held
liable for the failure to install traffic control devices because
the decision to install such devices was "discretionary". Under
Utah law, governmental entities have not waived

immunity

for

"discretionary" acts. However, Utah County does not have discretion
to warn motorists of the dangerous condition of its streets. It
must warn motorists. Carroll v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888
(Utah 1970). Thus, the Jones decision would not apply to shield
Utah County against allegations that it failed to warn of the
dangerous Intersection. Thus, the trial court erroneously relied
upon Jones in granting summary judgment.
IV. Plaintiff alleged that Utah County lowered the speed limit
along 6000 West from the prima facie speed limit established by the
18

Utah legislature (55 miles per hour) without conducting a traffic
and engineering study as required by Utah law. Utah Code Ann. §416-46 (1988) §41-6-48 (1988).
The trial court erroneously granted summary judgment
where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Utah
County lowered the speed limit along 6000 West. The trial court, by
implication, ruled that there was no reduction in the prima facie
speed limit established by the Utah legislature because it did not
find Utah County liable for its failure to conduct a traffic and
engineering study. However, Officer Kerry Evans has testified that
6000 West was posted with a 35 miles per hour speed limit.
Utah

County's

failure

to

conduct

a

traffic

and

engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit was an actual
and proximate cause of the accident. If Utah County would have
conducted the required traffic and engineering study prior to
lowering the speed limit, it would have learned that vehicles were
traveling between 45 and 50 miles per hour and that some warning of
the dangerous Intersection was needed. The failure of Utah County
to conduct such a traffic and engineering study constitutes per se
negligence.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEGLIGENCE CASES.
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The trial court held as a matter of law that Utah County
did not breach its duty to maintain 6000 West in a condition
reasonably safe for travel and that Utah Countyfs actions were not
the cause of the accident. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
"[s]ummary

judgment should be granted with great caution in

negligence cases." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah
1985)• The Utah Supreme Court has also held that: "Although summary
judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence cases, it is
appropriate only in the most clear-cut cases." Ingram v. Salt Lake
City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). Application of these principles to
the instant case demands that this case be remanded for a jury
determination of Utah County's negligence.
II.
UTAH COUNTY HAD A DUTY TO WARN MOTORISTS USING
6000 WEST OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION CREATED
BY THE INTERSECTION.
The trial court held that Utah County could not be held
liable for Plaintiff's injuries because it did not have a duty to
place signs or use other means to warn motorists of the dangerous
Intersection. However, as demonstrated below, Utah County had a
common law, statutory, and self-imposed duty to properly place and
maintain warning signs along 6000 West.
A. COMMON LAW DUTY
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that a governmental
entity

has

"a

non-delegable

duty

to

exercise

due

care

in

maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries in a condition
reasonably safe for travel. . . and the city may be held liable for
injuries proximately resulting from its failure to do so." Bowen v.
Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982).
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

stated:

"The

duty

of

municipal corporations with respect to the maintenance and repair
of traffic signs in this state is set out in 18 E. McQuillin, The
Law of Municipal Corporations." Richards v. Leavitt. 716 P.2d 276,
278 (Utah 1985). With respect to the duty to warn, McQuillin
indicates that there is a broad common law duty to sign roads and
streets to warn motorists of danger:
The absence of a sufficient barrier, guard,
railing, light, [sign], or the like in a
public way, for the protection of travelers
using due care who are endangered by the want
of such precautions, constitutes a defect and
a want of repair. Accordingly, in addition to
the duty to repair, the duty of a municipality
to use ordinary care to keep its streets in
condition for use includes the duty, where
there are dangerous obstructions, declivities,
or excavations in or near the street, whether
created by the municipality itself or by third
persons, where it has notice thereof or notice
is unnecessary, to take proper precautions to
guard against accidents by the use of
railings, barriers, lights, or the like,
especially at night.
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18 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 54.90a, at
pp. 334-35 (emphasis added). The word "sign" was placed in brackets
in the above paragraph because the term was added in the most
recent supplement to McQuillin to make explicit that a municipality
has a duty to warn motorists of danger through signs or other
means.
American Jurisprudence has also found that a municipality
has a duty to warn motorists of a danger:
It is the duty of the responsible public
authority to exercise reasonable care to warn
travelers of defects, obstructions, and unsafe
places in its streets, highways, and bridges
of which is has or is chargeable with notice,
by barriers or guardrail, lights, warning
signs, or other means, which are reasonably
sufficient for that purpose, and if its fails
to do so it will be liable to one injured by
reason of that failure, assuming an exception
to its sovereign immunity from responsibility
for its torts. Especially is it the duty of
the public authority to give such warning in
the nighttime.
39 Am.Jur.2d,

Highways. Streets, and

Bridges,

§ 397

(1968).

American Jurisprudence has also found that "[w]here the responsible
public authority has notice of the dangerous condition of a
highway, it has the duty in the exercise of reasonable care to
place warning

signs thereon,

and

it

is liable

for

injuries

proximately resulting from its neglect to do so." Id. § 398.
American Jurisprudence has found in relation to the
proper signing of intersections:
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Although there is authority to the contrary,
it has been held that the public authority has
the duty to maintain adequate traffic control
signs at dangerous intersections on its
highways, and the breach of this duty
constitutes negligence rendering it liable for
injuries sustained in an accident proximately
resulting therefrom.
Id. § 400.
Also instructive is Annotation, Highways: Governmental
Duty to Provide Curve Warnings or Markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342
(1987). The annotation concludes that the general rule is that
fl

[m]oreover, it is the duty of the responsible public authority to

maintain

warning

signs

when

reasonably

necessary

to

enable

travelers exercising ordinary care and prudence to avoid injury."
Id. § 2[a], at 349.
There is also ample Utah case authority to support a
municipality's duty to properly warn motorists of hazards. For
example, in Bramel v. Utah State Road Commission. 465 P.2d 534
(Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court held that:
The answer to the first proposition is to be
found in applying the test found so generally
throughout the law of torts, and which is also
applicable here: Did the defendant Road
Commission discharge its duty of exercising
reasonable care under the circumstances by
placing adequate and appropriate warning signs
for the safety of traffic using the highway?
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Id. at 536 (emphasis added). In Carroll v. State Road Commission.
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Bramel.
stating that:
In the recent case of Bramel v. Utah State
Road Commission, this Court affirmed a
judgment against the Road Commission, wherein
the commission was found to have failed to
discharge its duty of exercising reasonable
care under the circumstances by placing
adequate and appropriate warning signs for the
safety of the traffic using the highway.
Id. at 890 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
Thus, the vast majority of authorities have held that a
municipality must properly warn motorists of hazards on its roads
or streets. The public policy for requiring such warnings is selfevident. An extreme example illustrates the point. Assume that a
city constructs a road which leads to the edge of a 10,000 foot
cliff. Can the governmental entity reasonably argue that it was not
required to place a sign on that road warning motorists of the
impending doom? The governmental entity could not reasonably argue
that under such circumstances

its roads were in a condition

"reasonably safe for travel."
Similarly, Utah County cannot plausibly argue that 6000
West was "reasonably safe for travel" without some warning that
motorists using 6000 West were approaching an intersection where
extra caution was needed due to the inadequate sight distance and
where there was a probability that, at normal speeds and without
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extra caution, users of 6000 West would be unable to avoid an
accident with motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North.
Utah County had a common law duty to warn motorists using
6000 West of the dangerous sight distance problem caused by the
location of the Intersection. Because the trial court erroneously
concluded that there was no such duty, summary judgment in favor of
Utah County was improper and should be reversed.
B. STATUTORY DUTY TO WARN MOTORISTS
The trial court based its decision solely on the lack of
a common law duty requiring governmental entities to warn motorists
of the dangerous condition of its roads. The trial court did not
consider whether there would be any controlling statutory duty
requiring governmental entities to warn motorists. However, Utah
law requires that governmental entities properly sign roads and
streets under their control:
Local
authorities, in their
respective
jurisdictions, shall place and maintain
official traffic-control devices upon highways
under their jurisdiction as they find
necessary to indicate and to carry out the
provisions of this chapter or local traffic
ordinances, or to regulate, warn, or guide
traffic. All traffic control devices erected
under this section shall conform to and be
maintained in conformance with the Department
of Transportation manual and specifications
for a uniform system of traffic-control
devices under Section 41-6-20.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988)(emphasis added).
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This section of the Utah Code has never been addressed by
either the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals.
However, applying traditional principles of statutory construction
yields the conclusion that Utah County was required by Utah law to
warn motorists of the dangerous Intersection. Utah Code Ann. § 416-22 (1988) states that governmental entities "shall" erect traffic
control devices to "regulate, warn, or guide traffic."

The term

"shall" is typically construed as imposing a mandatory requirement
as opposed to a mere direction. The Utah Supreme Court has held
that

,f

[w]hile fshall1 has been validly interpreted as directory .

. . it is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as
such previously in this and other jurisdictions." Board of Educ. of
Granite School v. Salt Lake City- 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983).
Thus, Utah County has not only a common law duty to warn
motorists of dangerous conditions on its roads, but it also has a
statutory duty.
C. UTAH COUNTY'S OWN STANDARDS IMPOSE A DUTY TO WARN
Mr. Paul Hawker, a traffic engineer for Utah County,
testified that Utah County had accepted the standards set forth in
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways.2

2

This

manual

is published

Mr. Hawker testified as follows:
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by

the

Federal

Highway

Administration, and contains standards for the installation and
maintenance of signs. (The Utah legislature has mandated that the
Department

of

Transportation

create

a manual

in

substantial

compliance with this Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. As
evidenced by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988), Utah County was also
bound statutorily by this manual).
This manual requires Utah County to warn motorists of
hazards on or near the road which render the road not "reasonably
safe for travel." Specifically, the manual provides that "Signs are
essential where special regulations apply at specific places or at
specific times only, or where hazards are not self-evident." Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, § 2A-1
(1988). The Manual also provides that:
Warning signs are used when it is deemed
necessary to warn traffic of existing or
potentially
hazardous
conditions
on or
Q. Are you familiar with the manual of Uniform
Traffic Control Devices?
A. Yes.
* * *

Q. How does Utah County view the principles
set forth in the book? Are they good
suggestions? Are they strong recommendations?
Are they principles to be adhered to? How
would you evaluate them?
A. Utah County has accepted the manual as our
standard.
R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, p. 21).
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adjacent to a highway or street. Warning signs
require caution on the part of the vehicle
operator and may call for a reduction of speed
or a maneuver in the interest of his own
safety and that of other vehicle operators and
pedestrians.
Id. § 2C-1 (emphasis added).
Utah County's own standards required it to properly sign
that portion of 6000 West, including appropriate warnings of the
upcoming dangerous Intersection.
Thus, Utah County had a duty to properly sign the
Intersection. This duty was based on the common law, on Utah
statutory law, and on Utah County's own principles and standards.
As demonstrated immediately below, the cases relied upon by the
trial court to the contrary are inapplicable.
III.
THE CASE AUTHORITY RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL
COURT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
The trial court relied upon Stevens v. Salt Lake County,
478 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1970), and Jones v. Bountiful City, 834
P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), in concluding that Utah County did not
have a duty to warn motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous
Intersection. However, for the reasons set forth below, these cases
do not properly state the legal principles which are applicable to
this case.
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Any discussion of Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d
496, 499 (Utah 1970), must begin with a statement of the facts of
that rather unique case. The plaintiff was riding his "mini-bike"
along a "pathway" in a vacant lot. He emerged onto a county road
and was struck by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that due to
some tall weeds and bushes, defendant and plaintiff could not see
each other until it was too late to avoid an accident.

Plaintiff

alleged Salt Lake County had a duty to correct the visibility by
removing, or forcing the removal of bushes on the adjacent private
land.
The Utah Supreme Court correctly held that "[i]t would
place a wholly impractical burden upon counties if they had to
assume the duty of correcting such conditions with respect to every
private way that enters upon a private road." Id. at 499. However,
as important as this holding is what the Utah Supreme Court did not
hold. The Court took great pains to limit the holding of Stevens to
its particular facts:
In respect to our analysis of the claim
against Salt Lake County, it is appropriate to
observe that there is not here presented any
such broad problem as to whether there may be
some circumstances where a public road is so
positioned and/or maintained in relation to
adjacent conditions that there is created such
a hazard as to create a "defective, unsafe or
dangerous condition of the highway." Our
concern is with the particular facts shown in
this case[.]
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Id. (emphasis in original)•
Essentially, the trial court extrapolated the holding in
Stevens to hold that a governmental entity could never be held
liable for the dangerous condition of its roads when the danger
results from a causative force not in the roadway. In other words,
Utah County argued, and the trial court accepted, the notion that
so long as the causative force is outside the physical boundaries
of the road, the governmental entity no longer has a duty to
maintain its roads and streets in a condition "reasonably safe for
travel."
This is contrary to established legal principles and
common sense. For example, McQuillin has stated that "the duty of
a municipality

to use ordinary care to keep

its streets in

condition for use includes the duty, where there are dangerous
obstructions, declivities, or excavations in or near the street,
whether created by the municipality itself or by third persons,
where it has notice thereof or notice is unnecessary, to take
proper precautions to guard against accidents by the use of
railings, barriers, lights, or the like, especially at night." 18
E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 54.90a, at pp.
334-35 (emphasis added).
The fundamental inquiry is not from where the hazard
arises, but whether or not the road is "reasonably safe for
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travel." Utah County attempts to distinguish between roads not
"reasonably safe for travel" due to hazards in the road and those
roads not "reasonably safe for travel" due to conditions adjacent
to the road. In both instances, the road is not "reasonably safe
for travel." In both instances, Utah County's duty to maintain its
roads in a condition "reasonably safe for travel" is the same.
There is no support for Utah County's argument that it does not
have to fulfill its duty to maintain its roads in a condition
"reasonably safe for travel" simply because the causative factor
leading to the dangerous condition is not on the road itself.
The limiting language in Stevens was placed there to
avoid an unwarranted extrapolation of the holding of that case.
The danger in Stevens, an intersection between a "path" and a
unimproved county road, is vastly different than the intersection
here, which was between a paved, improved county road, and a paved,
improved subdivision road. While the governmental entity need not
provide a warning as to every driveway and path that adjoin road,
it should be required to warn of dangerous intersections between
roads within the public road system.
The trial court also relied upon this Court's decision in
Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992).
this Court held:
Rather than placing a duty on a municipality
to erect traffic control devices, the common
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In Jones,

law requires only that once the municipality
takes action to install such devices, it must
do so in a non-negligent manner.
Id.

at

560

(quoting

19 E. McQuillin,

The

Law

of Municipal

Corporations, § 54.28b, at 90 (3d ed. 1985)). The language from
McQuillin relied upon by this Court in the Jones decision was as
follows:
Thus, though a city is not generally liable
for failure to install signs or signals, if it
undertakes to do so and invites public
reliance on such signs or signals, it may be
held liable for creating a dangerous condition
or nuisance.2
Id.

(footnote in original). Consideration of the footnote is

essential. McQuillinfs statement that a municipality cannot be held
liable for its failure to install traffic control devices is based
on the ruling of many courts that the decision as to whether or not
to install traffic control devices is a "discretionary" act for
which immunity has been retained.
However, a governmental entity does not have discretion
to chose to warn or not warn motorists of a dangerous condition in
its roads. It must provide a warning. Thus, there is no immunity
and the governmental entity may be sued. For example, McQuillin has
stated that:

2

Governmental function immunity as applied to traffic
lights and signs, see ch. 53.
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In addition, even in jurisdictions providing
for sign placement immunity, a public entity
may be liable for the creation of a dangerous
condition if it fails to post signs.
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 53.42.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that a municipality
is not immune from allegations that it failed to warn. In Carroll
v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1970), the Utah
Supreme Court held:
In the instant action, the decision of the
road supervisor to use berms as the sole means
of protection for the unwary traveler was not
a basic policy decision essential to the
realization or accomplishment of some basic
governmental policy, program, or objective.
His decision did not require the exercise of
basic
policy
evaluation,
judgment,
and
expertise on the part of the Road Commission.
His
determination
may
properly
be
characterized as one at the operational level
of decision making, and the trial court did
not err in its ruling that the discretionary
exception of Section 63-30-10(1) of the
Governmental Immunity Act was not a defense to
the alleged acts of negligence.
Id. at 891-92. Perhaps a more crisp statement of the law was made
by Justice Ellett, concurring in Carroll:
In this case there was no place for discretion
to give or not to give an adequate warning to
the motoring public. The duty on the part of
the State to give and maintain a reasonably
adequate warning was absolute, and I am unable
to see where discretion is involved.
Id. at 892. Utah County cannot claim that its failure to warn was
based on a "discretionary" act. It follows that it cannot rely on
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Jones to shield itself from liability, for Jones was based on
governmental immunity which Utah County does not have.
The Supreme Court of Florida faced similar issues in
Department of Trans, v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1982). There,
the

plaintiffs

were

injured

when

they

traveled

through

an

unregulated intersection and were struck by another vehicle. They
sued the Department of Transportation alleging that it failed to
sign the intersection. The Florida Supreme Court distinguished
between the decision not to place traffic control devices at the
intersection

and the decision

not to warn motorists

of the

dangerous intersection:
In our view, decisions relating to the
installation of appropriate traffic control
methods and devices or the establishment of
speed limits are discretionary decisions which
implement the entity's police power and are
judgmental, planning level functions.
Id. at 1077. However, with respect to the duty to warn, the Supreme
Court of Florida held:
The failure to so warn of a known danger is,
in our view, a negligent omission at the
operational level of government and cannot
reasonably be argued to be within the
judgmental, planning-level sphere. Clearly,
this type of failure may serve as the basis or
an action against the governmental entity.
Id. at 1078. Thus, the Court held that if the plaintiff alleged
that the government failed to warn of the intersection, it could be
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held liable, but if the sole contention was that the government
failed to sign the intersection, it could not be held liable. Id.
Thus, the underlying basis for the Jones decision was
that a governmental entity has discretion to erect traffic control
devices. But the entity does not have discretion to warn of
dangerous conditions in its roads and streets. The principles of
governmental immunity and, ultimately, the decision of this Court
in Jones do not apply to the present case because Plaintiff has
alleged a failure to warn. The trial court erroneously applied
Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), to the
present case.
In sum, Utah County had an absolute, non-delegable duty
to place warning signs or otherwise warn motorists of the dangerous
Intersection. Those cases relied upon by the trial court are
inapplicable. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's ruling that Utah County did not have a
duty to warn of the dangerous Intersection, and remand this matter
for a trial on the merits.
IV.
UTAH COUNTY WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT A TRAFFIC AND ENGINEERING STUDY OF
6000 WEST BEFORE REDUCING THE SPEED LIMIT.
In its memorandum opposing Utah County's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argued that Utah County was negligent
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in that it failed to conduct a traffic and engineering study prior
to reducing the speed limit along 6000 West. The source of Utah
County's duty to conduct such an investigation is found in the
following statutes:
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and
subject to subsection (3) and Sections 41-6-47
and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful.
Any speed in excess of these limits is prima
facie
evidence
that
the
speed
is
not
reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a
school building or its grounds during
school recess or while children are going
to or leaving school during opening or
closing
hours,
except
that
local
authorities may require a complete stop
before passing a school building or
grounds at any of these periods;
(b) twenty-five
district; and

miles

per

hour

in

any

urban

(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1988). Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-48 (1988)
provides:
(1) When local authorities in their respective
jurisdictions determine on the basis of an
engineering and traffic investigation that the
prima facie speed permitted under this article
is
not
reasonable
and
safe
under
the
conditions found to exist upon a highway or
part of a highway, the local authority may
determine a reasonable and safe prima facie
limit which:
(a) decreases the limit at intersections;
(b) increases the limit within an urban district;
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(c) decreases the limit outside an urban district,
but not to less than 35 miles per hour.
Id. Thus, under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-48 (1988), the prima facie
speed limit for 6000 West was 55 miles per hour. R.683 (Affidavit
of C. Arthur Guerts, J 1).

If the speed limit was lowered, it must

be based upon a traffic and engineering study. Plaintiff contended
that Utah County lowered the speed to 35 miles per hour in March,
1988,

and

therefore, was required

to conduct

a traffic and

engineering study. Utah County responded that the sign referred to
by Plaintiff governed southbound traffic. (The driver involved in
the accident was traveling northbound at the time of the accident.)
Thus, the trial court concluded that Utah County was under no duty
to conduct a traffic and engineering study because it did not lower
the speed limit.
This ruling was in error for two reasons. First, there is
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Utah County
lowered the speed along 6000 West. Officer Kerry Evans testified:
Q. Do you know what the posted speed limit was
on this section of road?
A* I'm thinking—
MR. HENNING: Don't guess. I you can't recall, tell him
your recollection, but don't guess.
THE WITNESS: 35.
Q. (Mr. Lund) Was it posted?
A. Yes.
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R. 354 (Deposition of Kerry Evans, p. 18). On the other hand, Mr.
Paul Hawker, Utah County's traffic engineer, testified:
Q. Do you now what the speed limit is on that roads?
***

A. Accurately I don't remember what the speed limit is.
Q. If the speed limit is not posted on a rural road lie
that, what would it be by statute, do you know that?
A. County ordinance states that any county road not
posted is 40 miles per hour, or has a speed limit of 40
miles an hour. That road doesn't go 40 miles per hour.
R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, pp. 13-14).
Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the
speed limit along 6000 West prior to the accident. The speed limit
could have been 35 miles per hour as testified to by Mr. Evans or
it could have been unposted, in which case Mr. Hawker believes it
would have a speed limit of 40 miles per hour. In fact, 6000 West
could have been posted with another speed limit. The Plaintiff
cannot state to this Court with any degree of certainty what the
speed limit is along 6000 West. Utah County has also not set forth
what the speed limit along that road was. All the Plaintiff has to
go on is the testimony of Officer Evans that the road was posted
with a 35 miles per hour sign. The trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in light of this genuine issue of material fact.
The second error in the trial court's ruling was that it
assumed if 6000 West did not have a posted speed limit, Utah County
did not have a duty to conduct a traffic and engineering study.
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However, as noted above, Mr. Hawker has testified that if the road
is not posted, Utah County has established a prima facie speed
limit of 40 miles per hour. The Utah legislature, under the
following statute, has mandated that if Utah County is going to
lower the prima facie speed limit on roads in its jurisdiction, as
Utah

County

did

here,

it must

first

conduct

a traffic and

engineering study:
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions
shall determine by an engineering
and traffic
investigation the prima facie speed for all highways
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare a
reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be
different than the prima facie speed permitted under this
chapter for an urban district.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-48 (1988).
Under Utah statute, any reduction in the speed of a road
from the prima facie speed limit established by the legislature
must be done pursuant to a traffic and engineering study. Here,
there is a genuine issue of fact as to how much Utah County lowered
the speed limit from the 55 miles per hour speed limit established
by the legislature. Based on the testimony elicited to date, it
seems clear that Utah County either lowered the speed limit to a
posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour or has not posted the road,
which Mr. Hawker has testified means the road has a speed limit of
40 miles per hour. In either case, the speed limit has been lowered
from 55 miles per hour. Under state statute, this reduction in the
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speed limit could legally be done only pursuant to a traffic and
engineering study. Utah County's failure to obey the state statute
renders it negligent.
Utah County has conceded that it failed to conduct a
traffic and engineering study along 6000 West prior to reducing the
speed limit:
Interrogatory No. 5 Identify all traffic
engineering studies, speed zone studies and or
safety studies for 6000 West from Star Route
(11100 South northerly to 11800 North) in Utah
County for the years 19799 [sic]-1989.
Answer: None.
(Defendant Utah County's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories, Requests of Admissions and Requests for Production
of Documents.) Thus, Plaintiff has established that Utah County had
a duty under state statute and that it breached that duty by
failing to conduct a traffic and engineering

study prior to

lowering the speed limit along 6000 West.
The failure of Utah County to conduct a proper traffic
and engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit along 6000
West was an actual and proximate cause of the accident.

In order

to understand Plaintiff's position regarding causation, it is
essential to understand one simple principle of highway design:
motorists will travel at or around the 85th percentile speed
regardless of the posted speed limit. (The 85th percentile speed is
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the speed at which 85 percent of vehicles travel at or below.)
Plaintifffs expert witness, C. Arthur Guerts, opined that "vehicles
will travel at or near the 85th percentile speed regardless of the
posted speed limit." R. 683 (Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, f 13).
Mr. Paul Hawker also testified that "the goal a lot of times is to
have a road speed limit at what 80 percentile of the traffic is
doing."

R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, p. 15).
Mr. Guerts testified that based upon his investigation,

the "85th percentile" speed for vehicles traveling north on 6000
West is 48.1 miles per hour. R. 683 (Affidavit of Arthur Guerts, f
12) . Applying the above principle of highway design, motorists will
travel at or near 48 miles per hour regardless of the posted speed
limit.
Utah County has conceded that two elements it considers
when conducting a proper traffic and engineering study is the speed
of traffic and any attendant sight distance problems.3

If Utah

Interrogatory No. 4: Detail factors that are considered
in determining speed limits and intersection safety
improvement.
Answer: The defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 4 on
the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome
and impossible to answer with any particularity. Without
waiving the foregoing objections, the defendant responds
that it utilizes factors considered in the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices and other guidelines.
Included among the elements to be considered are the
following:
a) Traffic Counts
41

County would have conducted a traffic and engineering study in
accordance with its own standards in this case, it would have
discovered that traffic was going to travel at or near 48 miles per
hour and that at that speed, there was a danger that motorists
would not be able to avoid an accident with motorists entering the
Intersection from 6000 West. Utah County would have learned that
additional measures were needed to warn motorists of the sight
distance problem in order to avoid injury. Mr. Guerts opined that
"if Utah County would have conducted a proper engineering

and

traffic investigation prior to the installation of the 35 miles per
hour speed

limit

on 6000 West,

it would have discovered

that

corrective measures were needed to protect motorists using 6000
West

from

the hazard

which

existed

due

to the

limited

sight

distances at the intersection of 6000 West and 11500 North." R. 683
(Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, f 16).
As discussed above, the trial court resolved this claim
by concluding that Utah County did not lower the speed limit from
b) Previous Accident History,
c) Sight Distance and Angle Problems,
d) Area Traffic Patterns and Speeds,
e) Right of way and Road Problems
f) History of Weather Problems
g) Input from others (law enforcement, UDOT, school
bus, public, etc.)
(Defendant Utah County's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories, Requests of Admissions and Requests for Production
of Documents (emphasis added)).
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55 miles per hour along 6000 West, despite the testimony of Officer
Evans that the road had a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour
and the testimony of Utah County's own traffic engineer, Paul
Hawker, who testified that an unposted road had a speed limit of 40
miles per hour. The summary judgment in favor of Utah County should
be reversed in order to resolve these genuine issues of material
fact.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the summary judgment granted to
Utah County.
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DATED this «8*y

day of April, 1993.
MORGAN & HANSEN

Stepnen G. Morgan
/I
Joseph E. Minnock
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
&>-*

I hereby certify that on the <?q

day of April, 1993, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT
to be hand-delivered to the following:
Lee C. Henning
David C. Richards
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Utah County
510 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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